HOLY
SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS G.R. No.
163980
ASSOCIATION,
INC. and NESTORIO
F.
APOLINARIO, in his personal
capacity
and as President of Holy
Spirit
Homeowners Association, Inc., Present:
Petitioners,
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
-
versus - PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
in his capacity
as Chairman of the CARPIO,
Housing and Urban Development
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
Coordinating
Council (HUDCC),
ATTY.
EDGARDO PAMINTUAN, CARPIO MORALES,
in
his capacity as General Manager of CALLEJO, SR.,
the
National Housing Authority (NHA),
AZCUNA,
MR.
PERCIVAL CHAVEZ, in his TINGA,
capacity
as Chairman of the Presidential CHICO-NAZARIO,
Commission
for the Urban Poor (PCUP), GARCIA,
and
MAYOR
FELICIANO BELMONTE, in VELASCO, JR., JJ.
his
capacity as Mayor of Quezon City,
SECRETARY
ELISEA GOZUN, in her
capacity
as Secretary of the Department
of
Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR)
and SECRETARY FLORENTE Promulgated:
SORIQUEZ,
in his capacity as Secretary
of
the Department of Public Works and
Highways
(DPWH) as ex-officio members
of
the NATIONAL GOVERNMENT August 3, 2006
CENTER
ADMINISTRATION
COMMITTEE,
Respondents.
x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
D E C I S I O N
Tinga, J.:
The
instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise
known as the “National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act
of 2003.”
Petitioner
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners
association from the
Named
respondents are the ex-officio members of the National Government Center
Administration Committee (Committee). At the filing of the instant petition,
the Committee was composed of Secretary Michael Defensor, Chairman of the
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), Atty. Edgardo
Pamintuan, General Manager of the National Housing Authority (NHA), Mr. Percival
Chavez, Chairman of the Presidential Commission for Urban Poor (PCUP), Mayor Feliciano
Belmonte of Quezon City, Secretary Elisea Gozun of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and Secretary Florante Soriquez of
the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).
Prior
to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of presidential issuances authorized
the creation and development of what is now known as the National Government
Center (NGC).
On
On
In view of the rapid increase in
population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from the
coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel Ramos issued
Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development
of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can effectively
become beneficiaries of the government’s socialized housing program.[3]
On
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby
declared the policy of the State to secure the land tenure of the urban poor.
Toward this end, lands located in the NGC,
Sec. 3. Disposition
of Certain Portions of the
Sec. 4. Disposition of Certain Portions of the
In accordance with Section 5 of R.A.
No. 9207,[4]
the Committee formulated the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A.
No. 9207 on
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1)
AND 3.2 (C.1) OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS “NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC) HOUSING AND LAND UTILIZATION ACT OF
2003” SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR BEING INCONSISTENT WITH THE LAW IT
SEEKS TO IMPLEMENT.
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1)
AND 3.2 (C.1) OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS “NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC) HOUSING AND LAND UTILIZATION ACT OF
2003” SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR BEING ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND
WHIMSICAL.[5]
First, the procedural matters.
The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) argues that petitioner Association cannot question the implementation of
Section 3.1 (b.2) and Section 3.2 (c.1) since it does not claim any right over
the NGC East Side. Section 3.1 (b.2) provides for the maximum lot area that may
be awarded to a resident-beneficiary of the NGC East Side, while Section 3.2
(c.1) imposes a lot price escalation penalty to a qualified beneficiary who
fails to execute a contract to sell within the prescribed period.[6]
Also, the OSG contends that since petitioner association is not the duly
recognized people’s organization in the NGC and since petitioners not qualify
as beneficiaries, they cannot question the manner of disposition of lots in the
NGC.[7]
“Legal standing” or locus standi has
been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged….
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”[8]
Petitioner association has the legal
standing to institute the instant petition, whether or not it is the duly
recognized association of homeowners in the NGC. There is no dispute that the
individual members of petitioner association are residents of the NGC. As such
they are covered and stand to be either benefited or injured by the enforcement
of the IRR, particularly as regards the selection process of beneficiaries and
lot allocation to qualified beneficiaries. Thus, petitioner association may
assail those provisions in the IRR which it believes to be unfavorable to the
rights of its members. Contrary to the OSG’s allegation that the failure of petitioner
association and its members to qualify as beneficiaries effectively bars them from
questioning the provisions of the IRR, such circumstance precisely operates to
confer on them the legal personality to assail the IRR. Certainly, petitioner
and its members have sustained direct injury arising from the enforcement of
the IRR in that they have been disqualified and eliminated from the selection
process. While it is true that petitioners claim rights over the NGC West Side
only and thus cannot be affected by the implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2), which
refers to the NGC East Side, the rest of the assailed provisions of the IRR,
namely, Sections 3.1 (a.4), 3.2 (a.1) and 3.2 (c.1), govern the disposition of
lots in the West Side itself or all the lots in the NGC.
We cannot, therefore, agree with the
OSG on the issue of locus standi. The petition does not merit dismissal
on that ground.
There are, however, other procedural
impediments to the granting of the instant petition. The OSG claims that the
instant petition for prohibition is an improper remedy because the writ of
prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a quasi-legislative function.[9]
Since in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function, which is the scope
of a petition for prohibition under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the instant prohibition should be dismissed outright, the OSG
contends. For their part, respondent Mayor of Quezon City[10]
and respondent NHA[11]
contend that petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing
the instant petition with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals, which
has concurrent jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition.
The cited breaches are mortal. The
petition deserves to be spurned as a consequence.
Administrative agencies possess
quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative
adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative
or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results
in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute
and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.[12]
In questioning the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a
party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where
the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its
quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its
rule-making or quasi-legislative power.[13]
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant
to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A.
No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by
the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and
purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the
regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.[14]
Since the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee
in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail
its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does
not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.[15]
True, this Court has the full
discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly with it if
compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, so warrant.[16] A
direct invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition.[17]
In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v.
Melicor,[18] the
Court said that it will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and
compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious
implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of
certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.[19]
A perusal, however, of the petition for prohibition shows no compelling,
special or important reasons to warrant the Court’s taking cognizance of the
petition in the first instance. Petitioner also failed to state any reason that
precludes the lower courts from passing upon the validity of the questioned
IRR. Moreover, as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution,[20]
the Court’s power to evaluate the validity of an implementing rule or
regulation is generally appellate in nature. Thus, following the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts, the instant petition should have been initially filed with
the Regional Trial Court.
A petition for prohibition is also
not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a
quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed
against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or
person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or
in excess of said entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[21] Prohibition
lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or
quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is
to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to
maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.[22] Prohibition
is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or
power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in
handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses
the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy
available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained.[23] Where
the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an
ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that
“respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in
excess of their jurisdiction” may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court
through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.
In a number of petitions,[24] the
Court adequately resolved them on other grounds without adjudicating on the
constitutionality issue when there were no compelling reasons to pass upon the
same. In like manner, the instant petition may be dismissed based on the
foregoing procedural grounds. Yet, the Court will not shirk from its duty to
rule on the merits of this petition to facilitate the speedy resolution of this
case. In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the
interest of substantial justice. And the power of the Court to except a
particular case from its rules whenever the purposes of justice require it
cannot be questioned.[25]
Now, we turn to the substantive
aspects of the petition. The outcome, however, is just as dismal for
petitioners.
Petitioners assail the following
provisions of the IRR:
Section 3. Disposition of Certain portions of the NGC
Site to the bonafide residents
3.1. Period for Qualification of Beneficiaries
x
x x x
(a.4)
Processing and evaluation of qualifications shall be based on the Code of
Policies and subject to the condition that a beneficiary is qualified to
acquire only one (1) lot with a minimum of 36 sq. m. and maximum of 54 sq. m. and
subject further to the availability of lots.
x
x x x
(b.2) Applications for qualification as beneficiary
shall be processed and evaluated based on the Code of Policies including the
minimum and maximum lot allocation of 35 sq. m. and 60 sq. m.
x
x x x
3.2. Execution of the Contract to Sell
(a) Westside
(a.1) All qualified beneficiaries shall execute
Contract to Sell (CTS) within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of the IRR
in order to avail of the lot at P700.00 per sq. m.
x
x x x
(c) for both eastside and westside
(c.1) Qualified beneficiaries who failed to execute
CTS on the deadline set in item a.1 above in case of westside and in case of
eastside six (6) months after approval of the subdivision plan shall be
subjected to lot price escalation.
The rate shall be based on the formula to be set by
the National Housing Authority factoring therein the affordability criteria.
The new rate shall be approved by the NGC-Administration Committee
(NGC-AC).
Petitioners contend that the
aforequoted provisions of the IRR are constitutionally infirm as they are not
germane to and/or are in conflict with the object and purpose of the law sought
to be implemented.
First. According to petitioners, the
limitation on the areas to be awarded to qualified beneficiaries under Sec. 3.1
(a.4) and (b.2) of the IRR is not in harmony with the provisions of R.A. No.
9207, which mandates that the lot allocation to qualified beneficiaries shall
be based on the area actually used or occupied by bona fide residents
without limitation to area. The argument is utterly baseless.
The beneficiaries of lot allocations
in the NGC may be classified into two groups, namely, the urban poor or the bona
fide residents within the NGC site and certain government institutions
including the local government. Section 3, R.A. No. 9207 mandates the
allocation of additional property within the NGC for disposition to its bona
fide residents and the manner by which this area may be distributed to
qualified beneficiaries. Section 4, R.A. No. 9207, on the other hand, governs
the lot disposition to government institutions. While it is true that Section 4
of R.A. No. 9207 has a proviso mandating that the lot allocation shall be based
on the land area actually used or occupied at the time of the law’s
effectivity, this proviso applies only to institutional beneficiaries
consisting of the local government, socioeconomic, charitable, educational and
religious institutions which do not have specific lot allocations, and not to
the bona fide residents of NGC. There is no proviso which even hints that
a bona fide resident of the NGC is likewise entitled to the lot area
actually occupied by him.
Petitioners’ interpretation is also
not supported by the policy of R.A. No. 9207 and the prior proclamations
establishing the NGC. The government’s policy to set aside public property aims
to benefit not only the urban poor but
also the local government and various government
institutions devoted to socioeconomic,
charitable, educational and
religious purposes.[26]
Thus, although Proclamation No. 137 authorized the sale of lots to bona fide
residents in the NGC, only a third of the entire area of the NGC was declared
open for disposition subject to the condition that those portions being used or
earmarked for public or quasi-public purposes would be excluded from the
housing program for NGC residents. The same policy of rational and optimal
land use can be read in Proclamation No. 248 issued by then President Ramos.
Although the proclamation recognized the rapid increase in the population
density in the NGC, it did not allocate additional property within the NGC for
urban poor housing but instead authorized the vertical development of the same
150 hectares identified previously by Proclamation No. 137 since the
distribution of individual lots would not adequately provide for the housing
needs of all the bona fide residents in the NGC.
In addition, as provided in Section 4
of R.A. No. 9207, the institutional beneficiaries shall be allocated the areas actually
occupied by them; hence, the portions intended for the institutional
beneficiaries is fixed and cannot be allocated for other non-institutional
beneficiaries. Thus, the areas not intended for institutional beneficiaries
would have to be equitably distributed among the bona fide residents of
the NGC. In order to accommodate all qualified residents, a limitation on the
area to be awarded to each beneficiary must be fixed as a necessary
consequence.
Second. Petitioners note that while Sec.
3.2 (a.1) of the IRR fixes the selling rate of a lot at P700.00 per sq.
m., R.A. No. 9207 does not provide for the price. They add Sec. 3.2 (c.1) penalizes
a beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within six (6) months
from the approval of the subdivision plan by imposing a price escalation, while
there is no such penalty imposed by R.A. No. 9207. Thus, they conclude that the
assailed provisions conflict with R.A. No. 9207 and should be nullified. The
argument deserves scant consideration.
Where a rule or regulation has a
provision not expressly stated or contained in the statute being implemented,
that provision does not necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule
is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary
legislation by providing the details thereof.[27] All
that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in
conformity with the standards prescribed by the law.[28]
In Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee
is granted the power to administer, formulate guidelines and policies,
and implement the disposition of the areas covered by the law. Implicit in this
authority and the statute’s objective of urban poor housing is the power of the
Committee to formulate the manner by which the reserved property may be
allocated to the beneficiaries. Under this broad power, the Committee is mandated
to fill in the details such as the qualifications of beneficiaries, the selling
price of the lots, the terms and conditions governing the sale and other key particulars
necessary to implement the objective of the law. These details are purposely
omitted from the statute and their determination is left to the discretion of
the Committee because the latter possesses special knowledge and technical
expertise over these matters.
The Committee’s authority to fix the
selling price of the lots may be likened to the rate-fixing power of
administrative agencies. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only
standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the
administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it
has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to
reasonableness, this standard may be implied.[29] In
this regard, petitioners do not even claim that the selling price of the lots
is unreasonable.
The provision on the price escalation
clause as a penalty imposed to a beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to
sell within the prescribed period is also within the Committee’s authority to
formulate guidelines and policies to implement R.A. No. 9207. The Committee has
the power to lay down the terms and conditions governing the disposition of
said lots, provided that these are reasonable and just. There is nothing objectionable about prescribing
a period within which the parties must execute the contract to sell. This
condition can ordinarily be found in a contract to sell and is not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.
Third. Petitioners also suggest that the adoption
of the assailed IRR suffers from a procedural flaw. According to them the IRR
was adopted and concurred in by several representatives of people’s
organizations contrary to the express mandate of R.A. No. 9207 that only two
representatives from duly recognized peoples’ organizations must compose the
NGCAC which promulgated the assailed IRR. It is worth noting that petitioner association
is not a duly recognized people’s organization.
In subordinate legislation, as long
as the passage of the rule or regulation had the benefit of a hearing, the
procedural due process requirement is deemed complied with. That there is
observance of more than the minimum requirements of due process in the adoption
of the questioned IRR is not a ground to invalidate the same.
In sum, the petition lacks merit and
suffers from procedural deficiencies.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for
prohibition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Associate
Justice |
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate
Justice |
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate
Justice |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
|
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate
Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate
Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
C
E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN.
Chief Justice
[4]Sec. 5.
[7]
[8]Sanlakas
v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656, 665, citing IBP v. Zamora,
G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA 81.
[12]Smart Communications, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, 456 Phil. 145, 155 (2003).
[14]
[17]
[20]Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5 states: The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decrees, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question. x x x
[22]David
v. Rivera, G.R. Nos. 139913 & 140159,
[24]Development Bank of the Phils. v. Commission on Audit, 424 Phil. 411 (2002); Planters Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 375 Phil. 615 (1999); Spouses Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 761 (2001).
[25]Philippine
National Bank v. Sanao Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 153951,
[26]Republic
Act No. 9207 (2003), Sec. 2, provides: Declaration of Policy. –
It is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure the land tenure of the
urban poor. Toward this end, lands located in the NGC,
[27]Commissioner on Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 987, 1006-1007 (1996), citing Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of Finance Secretary, 238 SCRA 63.